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Until recently quality improvement has been mainly
applied to manufacturing. However, experience and the
explosive growth of the services industry has shown that
opportunities for simultaneous quality improvement must be
undertaken. Today, both the Government and contractors are
facing growing competitive and regulatory pressures to
deliver higher quality services. In an attempt to comply
with these pressures more emphasis has been placed on the
inspection process and subsequently on the contract
administration sections as they are tasked to develop and
apply efficient procedures for quality assurance. The
research indicated that there are four factors that
influence service quality. These factors are: the Quality
of Assurance, the Contractor, the Statement of Work and the
Performance Requirements Summary. The research concluded
that the Government and contractors face the same challenges
and must work together to develop a coherent policy on
quality, grounded in a common language, common management
principles, common standards and common goals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH
The principal objective of this thesis is to evaluate
and identify potential and existing problems with non-
technical services contracts. The evaluation will be based
on an analysis of trends within the past ten years. The
focus of the thesis will be on the factors that influence





In what ways could the drafting and administration
of services contracts be changed to improve the contractors
performance?
2 Subsidiary Questions
1. What are non-technical service type contracts?
2. Is there a way to write specifications that would
enhance contract performance?
3. Is the use of the current quality assurance plan a
method for improving contractor performance?
4. Are there ways to incentivize the contractor to
provide better performance?
C. SCOPE
The scope of this thesis will be limited by the
definition of non-technical service contracts. Because a
non-technical services contract is a contract that directly
engages the time and effort of a contractor whose primary
purpose is to perform an identifiable task—a narrowing of
the definition was needed for the study. This researcher
chose to define a non-technical service contract as food
service and custodial contracts because there is a
significant amount of literature available and they have
been in use longer than other types of services contracts.
The search for information in the literature was limited to
the past ten years with an emphasis on the more recent past
where data were available. To obtain the perspective of
significant problems, a review of all the Services' Inspec-
tor General and Audit Reports was undertaken. Additionally,
to enhance the understanding of the problems experienced by
personnel dealing with services contracts, personnel from
both the Government and service industry were interviewed.
The personnel selected were from the local area.
D. METHODOLOGY
The research was composed of three research methods.
Federal Legal Information Through Electronics (FLITE) , a
computer data base located in Denver, Colorado was utilized
to extract the data contained in Chapter III. FLITE was
searched for litigations involving the Commercial Activities
program to obtain abstracts of decisions rendered by the
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) . The
search strategy consisted of:
1. Restricting the search to decisions rendered by the
ASBCA.
2. Utilizing keywords index of "contracting out," "food
service," "custodial," and "A-76."
3. Restricting the search to the past ten years.
This strategy reflected a general search pattern that
was designed to capture the maximum number of decisions
involving services contracts as confined by the stated
restrictions
.
The second research method utilized was to review DOD
Inspector General Reports, Service Audit Reports and General
Audits aimed at measuring effectiveness. The amount of data
available from DLSIE allowed a more detailed look at the
problems encountered in services contracting.
The third research method was personal interviews.
These interviews provided an up-to-date method for assessing
the problems encountered by industry and the problems
encountered by the Government when writing and administering
services contracts.
E. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
The largest problem encountered by this researcher was
the accumulation and review of literature. The school
library does not maintain periodicals of the service
industry; however, these can be obtained from local
libraries. The problem becomes a matter of time and
planning. The use of outside services such as the Building
Service Contractors Association provided viable information
in a timely manner. Other large service industry groups
such as the Coalition of Service Industries did not respond
to written correspondence and were deleted from the research
effort. DLSIE has pertinent information; however, the
researcher must be specific and start early to gain full
benefit from the searches. This researcher utilized nine
custom bibliographies of which the individual report
bibliographies, when provided, were found to be the most
useful. A source neglected by this researcher was the Naval
Facilities Command, specifically the Naval Facilities
Contracts Training Center at Port Hueneme which this
researcher found only after the background search had been
completed.
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The organization of this thesis is structured such that
the reader can gain an understanding of the requirement to
contract for services as well as obtaining a flavor for the
explosive growth in the use of services contracts and the
associated problems with drafting and administering them.
Chapter II presents the background of the A-76 program
and the current methods used to measure effectiveness and
quality. The mechanics of contract quality assurance are
thoroughly detailed.
Chapter III presents the data from FLITE, Audit Reports
and personal interviews. Specific factors that influence
service quality are assessed and summarized.
Chapter IV provides an analysis of the results from
Chapter III and the causative factors that lead to the rate
of occurrence for each factor influencing service quality.
Chapter V contains the researchers conclusions and




The Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 was
promulgated in 1955, and has received bi-partisan support
for almost three decades. The activities subject to the
Circular range from furnishing base maintenance services at
military installations to operating federal automated data
processing centers. Essentially all Government operations
are subject to the stricture of OMB A-76 unless the activity
itself is inherently Governmental in nature. It rests on
three precepts.
1 . Retain Governmental Functions In-House
Certain functions, such as criminal investigations
and military operations are inherently Governmental
functions. These functions require either the exercise of
discretion in applying Government authority or the use of
value judgment in making a decision. The Secretary of
Defense has the authority to establish criteria for the
exemption of activities from A-76 for national defense
reasons. The authority, established in the Commercial
Activities Program, allows the continuing use of in-house
Department of Defense personnel when:
a. The Secretary of a Military Department or the Director
of a Defense Agency determines that the activity is
essential for training or experience in required
military skills, the activity is needed to provide
appropriate work assignments for a rotation base
overseas or sea-to-shore assignments, or the activity
is needed to provide career progression to needed
military skill levels.
b. The activity, though not a national defense activity,
is not separable from those activities that must
remain in-house for national defense or other reasons.
c. The activity is a core logistics activity defined by
Public Law 98-525 as amended by Public Law 99-145.
2
.
Achievement of Economy and Productivity Through
Competition
Whenever commercial sector performance of a
Government operated service is feasible, there shall be a
comparison of the cost of contracting in a competitive
environment against in-house performance to determine who
shall do the work.
3 Rely on the Commercial Sector
The Federal Government shall rely on commercially
available sources to provide commercial products and
services. The Government shall not start or carry on any
activity if the product or service can be procured more
economically from a commercial source. This will allow the
private sector to provide services and avoid increasing the
size of the Federal Government. [Ref. l:p. 5]
In its simplest form, the program calls upon Federal
agencies to procure new commercial goods and services from
the private sector, to identify all their commercial
activities, to conduct cost comparisons between existing
governmentally operated commercial activities and bidders,
and to select the most economical means for obtaining
commercial products and services. The revision in August of
1983 improved and simplified the cost comparison process.
B. OVERALL IMPACT OF OMB CIRCULAR A-7 6
This policy promotes efficient and cost effective
operations that benefit Federal managers, private
businessmen, and taxpayers. The policy interjects the
competitive market system into Government management and
thus provides an incentive for effective operations at the
most economical price. Realization of the program's
objective is based on three requirements:
1. Develop performance work statements that describe the
output and quality level required by the Government.
It provides a common baseline for the Government and
the private sector to organize and manage the
commercial activity being competed.
2. Determine the most effective and efficient operation
to form the basis for the cost comparison with
commercial firms. This is also called most efficient
organization (MEO) and is often used by the Government




Commercial firms and Government agencies compete in a
simulated free and open marketplace to perform the
activity. [Ref. l:p. 7]
Over 1700 cost studies have been conducted since 1979,
resulting in average savings of 28% over the previous cost
of the commercial activity to the Government—regardless of
whether Federal employees or contractors won the
competition. [Ref. l:p. 5]
C. IMPACT OF A-7 6 ON THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Table 2.1 depicts the value (in $ billion) of Department
of Defense (DOD) contracting actions for 18 types of
services reported individually on Standard Form 279 (SF279)
to the General Services Administration Federal Procurement
Data Center during the past ten years. [Refs. 2,3] It
should be noted that only contract actions with a value of
more than $25,000 must be reported on SF279; however, one
percent of the total can be attributed to actions under
$25,000, optionally reported.
TABLE 2.1
FY 1978, 1983, 1988 SERVICE CONTRACT
ACTIONS REPORTED ON SF 279




Source: U.S. General Service Administration Federal
Procurement Data Center Standard Report
As a result of this continuing trend toward contracting
out, service contractors have assumed a major role in day-
to-day operations of military installations. It is believed
that this trend will continue due to overall manpower
constraints and the need to reduce base-level support costs
in the new austere budget era. The explosive growth in
contract services has precipitated numerous management
problems. Previous studies of service contracting have
identified numerous factors which influence service quality.
A list of major factors always includes the contractor, the
statement of work, the Government quality inspector and the
quality inspection method. The performance of the
contractor and the Government quality inspector are direct
functions of the statement of work and the quality
inspection method. This is due to the rationale that
contractor performance can only be measured through specific
requirements. Additionally, the ability of an inspector to
determine whether a requirement has been met is a function
of the quality assurance method as well as the measurability
implicit in the requirements statement.
D. SERVICE CONTRACTS DEFINED
Until recently quality improvement has been mainly
applied to manufacturing. However, experience has shown
that opportunities for simultaneous quality improvement also
exist in service industries. The growing importance of the
service sector to our national (and world) economy is
evident. The June 1985 issue of Fortune magazine contained
the following data from the Coalition of Service Industries,
Incorporated (CSI)
:
1. Service industries generate (conservatively) two-
thirds of the United States Gross National Product.
2
.
Service industries employ three out of four working
Americans.
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3. Since World War II, the service sector has created, on
the average, 15 new jobs for each new manufacturing
job.
4. Over 95 percent of 25 million new jobs created since
1970 have been in the service industry.
The Federal Acquisition Regulation defines a service
contract as "A contract that directly engages the time and
effort of a contractor whose primary purpose is to perform
an identifiable task rather than provide an end item of
supply." Some of the areas in which service contracts are
found within DOD include the following:
1. Maintenance, overhaul, repair, servicing,
rehabilitation, salvage, modernization or modification
of supplies, systems, or equipment.
2. Routine recurring maintenance of real property.
3. Housekeeping and base services.
In supplying services a company sells directly to the
customer. Direct sales affords the company multiple
contacts with a large number of customers which offers a
greater opportunity to encounter both acceptable and
unacceptable types of service. Therefore, the communication
exchange experienced through these direct contacts provides
valuable feedback that can be used as a measure of control.
[Ref. 4:p. 13]
E. SERVICE VERSUS MANUFACTURING
Several important differences exist between service
industries and manufacturing industries. The major
differences are that service industries feature:
1. Large volume of transactions.
2. Large amount of paperwork movement.
3. Relatively small amounts of money per transaction.
4. An extremely large number of ways of making errors.
These characteristics highlight the fact that the
guality performance faced by a service industry is different
from that faced by manufacturing. This difference has
several implications:
1. Immediate human needs, human performance and large
masses of paperwork predominate. Customers, employees
and managers are involved. Therefore guality control
must concentrate on the guality of large masses of
data involved; on the guality of decisions made by
employees at all levels; and on the guality of the
responses made by the customers.
2. The major guality characteristics are error rates,
time, cost and buyer satisfaction.
3. The exposure to human error is tremendous. Errors can
be made by employees, managers and customers.
4. Quality of service is related to various time
components reguired to perform the service. For the
customer, these include arrangement time, immediate
waiting time and service time.
5. Quality of service is related to cost. The customer
wants acceptable guality service at an affordable
expenditure. The company wants to operate so as to
make a profit on its investment.
6. Customer complaints must be handled in an understand-
ing, expeditious and polite manner. [Ref. 4:p. 13]
Savings by a Government guality program can be just as
large as savings obtained in private industry as one out of
four service employees work for the Government. [Ref. 4:p.
14]
F. APPROACH TO QUALITY CONTROL
A more comprehensive approach to quality control is
needed in service operations than in manufacturing. Quality
control is applied to physical products, data, human
performance, management decisions and the environment. As
needs increase, greater complexities evolve. New techniques
have emerged as follows:




5. Random time sampling for work.
6. Input/ output analysis.
7. Learning curve analysis.
8. Written procedures and specifications.
9. Waiting or delay time analysis.
10. Field Testing and experimental design.
These methods provide an effective way of finding
trouble and instituting corrective action; however, there
are other objective indicators of trouble, such as:
1. Error rate is too high.
2. Idle time is excessive.
3. Delay is too long.
4. One massive error is found.
5. A violation of basic procedure is discovered.
6. Failure rate is too high.
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7. Cost is too high.
8. Too many complaints.
9. Critical or control level is exceeded.
10. Illegal action is discovered. [Ref. 4:p. 14]
G. STEPS TO QUALITY CONTROL
Quality control is a management tool which allows for
the management of important functions without being involved
in the detailed day-to-day operations. This can be achieved
through a series of steps:
1. Establish standards—Quality requirements are spelled
out in a contract by the use of specifications,
standards, drawings, and service description.
2. Measure performance—Compare service with standards,
accept or reject within established guidelines.
3
.
Take corrective action—Determine cause of failure and
start action to prevent a recurrence.
4. Improve the system—Continue to evaluate standards for
improvements and in methods of measuring conformance.
Develop more effective corrective action. [Ref. 5:p.
12]
Most companies employ a method of "management by
control" where the emphasis is placed on key control points
within the organizational structure. [Ref. 6:p. 53] It
provides for a system that addresses control and short term
gains. A simple, yet logical and consistent method, it
attempts to both measure and reward accomplishments.
However, since the established short term goals at the
different organizational levels are often independent of
each other management can find themselves in a position that
14
is diametrically opposed to the control system. [Ref. 6:p.
53] When measurable controls are unattainable or
impractical, individuals and groups tend to fabricate
conformance. The charade of conformance fosters guarded
communications and dishonesty. This creates a "blame it on
them" mentality and causes many to play it safe. [Ref. 6:p.
53] Fear is the prime motivator in management by control.
It encourages an organization to look inward at its own
structure rather than outward at the world in which the
customer operates.
H. SERVICE CONTRACT QUALITY ASSURANCE
One of the most difficult aspects of Government service,
contract administration is determining whether the services
called for were performed and if they were, whether they
were performed adequately. Inspection is the Government's
primary means of ensuring that it receives what it bargained
for. [Ref. 7:p. 2] The inspection process is carried out
either by inspecting the work or by conducting surveillance
of the contractor's inspection system. The Navy's
traditional approach for service contracts has been either
100% inspection or something less and often much less than
100%. [Ref. 8:p. 4] One hundred percent inspection is very
costly and often times infeasible due to personnel demands.
Less than 100% inspection, performed on a hit or miss basis,
appears to be the typical case. Government studies have
found that less than 100% inspection techniques focus on the
15
work process (adherence to specified steps and frequencies)
rather than on the quality of contract service performed. A
viable quality assurance evaluation approach is based on the
written plan tied to performance oriented specifications.
It will focus on the quality of the service delivered by the
contractor and not on the steps taken or procedures used to
provide the service. [Ref. 9:p. 2] It includes the use of
a discrete pre-planned evaluation technique, unscheduled
evaluations and validation of complaints. There are several
criteria for good quality assurance, some of the more
important being:
1. The statement of work (SOW) must be written so that
the quantity and quality of required outputs are
measurable. The rationale being that contractor
performance can only be measured through specific
requirements. Further, the ability of an inspector to
determine whether a requirement has been met is a
function of the measurability implicit in the
requirement statement, i.e., a requirement to keep a
room cool is subject to measurement error since cool
is a very subjective word; however, a requirement to
keep a room between 68 and 72 degrees can be precisely
measured.
2. The development of the SOW and Quality Assurance (QA)
Guide should be viewed as a single process.
3. The depth and detail of observations of work quality
should be geared to the importance of the services
provided.
4. QA plans must have the potential to support corrective
action when unsatisfactory performance occurs.
The process of assuring quality begins with a job
analysis performed by the utilization of a seven step
process. [Ref. 10:p. 2] The process is as follows:
1. Review and clarify the definition of the functional
area to identify all organizational elements and
services to be performed.
2. Prepare a work breakdown structure. This step takes
the defined service and reduces it to smaller parts.
3. Analyze the structure to facilitate an understanding
of what is needed to do the task, what comprises the
task, and what the task produces to develop an
effective work statement.
4. Collection of workload data and resource data. This
step encompasses a review of historical data and the
extrapolation of data in predicting future workload.
Resource evaluation is the determination of how many
personnel, what type of facilities, equipment or
material are required to perform the service.
5. Assign performance values for each service. These
values have components which are:
a. Realistic Performance Indicators—a measurable
characteristic of the service.
b. Measurable Standards—A statement of acceptable
performance
.
c. Establish an Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) for
each performance indicator. An AQL is an in-house
tool used to identify the point where work
performance would become unsatisfactory. The AQL
is stated as either a percentage of work that is
found to be in compliance or as a number of
occurrences of non-compliance.
6. Determine if there are any directives or instructions
that apply to the service to be provided.
7. Deduction Analysis—Standard clauses in service
contracts allow the Government to de zt payment in
the case of non-performance. The amount must
represent as closely as possible the cost of the
service foregone. [Ref. ll:p. 16] The information is
used to arrive at a figure for each service which
tells what percentage it is of the whole service. The
source of information is the personnel data and the
specific service outputs derived during job analysis.
The performance of detailed job analysis should result
in an outline that will ensure a smooth writing process for
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the SOW. The importance of performing a detailed job
analysis can not be overemphasized as the SOW becomes part
of the contract and is a contractually binding document on
both the contractor and the Government. Since the written
words translate into cost and profit, every word will be
scrutinized, and if possible interpreted by contractors to
their advantage. Every word, phrase and sentence must be
carefully thought out. The use of ambiguous terms is one of
the largest causes of interpretation and agreement problems.
[Ref. 12: p. 64] A well-written SOW is paramount to
successful contract completion.
Contractual requirements, regardless of how well written
are not self-enforcing. If the Government does not
adequately enforce its original requirements, there is a
high tendency toward not meeting these requirements. [Ref.
9:p. 9] Section 46.104(b) of the FAR states that the
contract administration office is to develop and apply
efficient procedures for performing Government contract
quality assurance actions. The surveillance plan is a
method of compliance with this policy.
The surveillance plan assures that the Government
maintains an active role in service contract management
through a systematic contract administration procedure. The
plan's goal is to determine if the contractor meets the
requirements of the contract, in terms of quantity and
quality. There are three key ideas that are the basis for
contract surveillance.
1. Quality Assurance relates to the output service
provided by the contractor when the output is based on
a contractor developed procedure, the procedures are
only looked at on a by exception basis (satisfactory
service output equals satisfactory procedures) . When
the procedure is specified by the Government,
compliance with the procedure is the desired output
service. [Ref. 13]
2. Contractor compliance is monitored throuqh performance
indicators which are specified in the SOW. A standard
of performance is the desired value for a performance
indicator and is the measuring stick that contractor
performance is compared against. [Ref. 13]
3
.
When observed performance indicators show output not
in compliance with contract requirements, the cause of
the problem must be identified. An evaluation must be
made to determine if the problem is caused by the
Government or the contractor. If the cause of the
problem is the Government, corrective action must be
taken through Government channels. No action is
required of the contractor. If the contractor is at
fault, the contractor is notified to take corrective
action and may be issued a Contractor's Discrepancy
Report (CDR) . [Ref. 13]
The difficulty of the surveillance process is to
distinguish which performance indicators are critical to
evaluate the service. Manpower constraints will usually
preclude the monitoring of all performance indicators and
even all values they may assume over the contractual period.
Therefore, only the key indicators are included in the
surveillance plan. Each contract requirement that is to be
monitored must have a Quality Assurance Plan. The plan
documents what and how the evaluator is to evaluate a
contract requirement. The five most common methods used to
evaluate the contractors performance are: random sampling,
19
planned sampling, 100% inspection, validated complaints, and
unscheduled inspections.
1 . Random Sampling
Surveillance based on random sampling is designed to
evaluate some part, but not all, of the contract reguirement
being monitored. This method is based on statistical theory
and estimates the contractor's overall level of performance
for a given contract reguirement. This method provides the
following advantages:
a. The contractor is unable to guess which occurrences of
work are most likely to be evaluated.
b. The evaluator's bias does not affect the specific
occurrences of work selected to be monitored.
c. All occurrences of an item of work are assumed to have
the same level of performance.
Evaluations are conducted by the Quality Assurance Evaluator
(QAE) and consist of measuring performance indicators for
selected items of work. Results are compared to performance
standards to check conformance. In order to implement a
random sampling evaluation, certain parameters have to be
set. These are level of surveillance, Acceptable Quality
Level (AQL) , and size of population. [Ref. 13]
The Level of Surveillance is based on statistical
confidence levels. The following table represents current
surveillance levels.
Initial evaluation would use a level IIA or IIB
depending on the importance of the item evaluated.
TABLE 2.2
LEVELS OF SURVEILLANCE





Source: NAVFAC SOP for Performance Evaluation
The acceptable quality level (AQL) is an arbitrarily
selected value used to distinguish between satisfactory and
unsatisfactory performance. It is generally stated as a
proportion. Since random sampling only provides an estimate
of the true defect rate, a margin for error must be used.
This is done by specifying accuracy requirements. The
accuracy required will be set at one half the AQL (AQL/2).
If the contractor's defect rate exceeds the AQL + AQL/2, his
overall performance is unsatisfactory.
The size of the population is the number of times a
service is performed over a given time period. The way in
which a service is defined allows some limited control over
population size. [Ref. 13]
2 . Planned Sampling
Surveillance based on planned sampling is designed
to inspect some part but not all of the contractor
requirements being monitored. Planned sampling differs from
random sampling by the way in which samples are selected.
The selection is based on some subjective rationale and
sample size is usually arbitrarily determined. This type of
surveillance is useful when a contractor's performance at a
selected location is poor or when importance of a contract
requirement depends on location of occurrence. With this
type of surveillance a systematic way of taking a subjective
(biased) look at service outputs is provided as well as a




One Hundred Percent Inspection
This is a method that requires 100% inspection of a
contract requirement. This approach is best suited for
monitoring contract requirements that occur infrequently,
have a low number of occurrences, or are of great
importance. This method measures the contractors true level
of performance but is an expensive and time-consuming method




This is a method based on customer awareness.
Customers familiar with contract requirements, monitor the
services provided by the contractor. When there is a case
of poor service or non-performance, the Quality Assurance
Evaluator (QAE) is notified. Upon notification, the QAE
investigates the report and documents it if it is valid.
22
The number of complaints is dependent upon the customers and
the relation between the QAE and the customers.
5 . Unscheduled Inspection
This is what the name implies. Impromptu
evaluations of contract requirements are conducted by the
QAE whenever he feels there is a need. This type of




Data used in this study were obtained from the Federal
Legal Information Through Electronics (FLITE) data base,
interviews with service contracting personnel from Fort Ord,
an interview with a services contractor lawyer, Service




The voluminous nature of the data obtained precludes
displaying it in its entirety in the text of this study.
Instead, the following summaries will provide the reasons
each factor influencing service quality was decided upon.
Table 3.1 is provided to display the data obtained. The
factors influencing service quality were drawn from the
literature review and are defined below:
1. SOW—Statement of Work.
2. PRS—Performance Requirements Summary.
3. QAE Problems—either with the inspector or the
inspection process.
4. Contractor—Actions usually taken to the detriment of
quality by the contractor under the auspice of cutting
costs.
1. ASBCA No. 35304
This case involved Silangan Manpower Services
appealing a contracting officer's final decision that
TABLE 3 .
1
FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE SERVICE QUALITY
FACTORS
TYPE QAE/INSPECTION
SOURCE CONTRACT SOW PRS PROCESS CONTRACTOR
ASBCA 35304 Custodial X






















terminated custodial services for failure to perform the
work as required by the contract. Silangan was required to
provide an adequate and effective inspection and contractor
quality assurance and control program pursuant to the
Inspection of Services clause. The overall performance was
deemed unsatisfactory and resulted in a discrepancy report
emphasizing the fact that the Government's quality assurance
surveillance was not a substitute for the contractor's
quality control efforts. After being advised of
deficiencies at successive weekly performance meetings over
two months a show cause notice was issued. The overall
findings of the board that the instances of non-performance
and unsatisfactory performance noted are attributable to a
lack of supervision, ineffective quality control measures,
no shows, lack of ownership of equipment necessary for
successful performance under the contract and failure to
meet its payroll obligations substantiate the placement of
this case under the contractor factor. [Ref. 14]
2. ASBCA 33280
This case involved Harris System International
appealing a contracting officer's decision denying a claim
for an equitable adjustment in the price of its services
contract. There were three claims in this appeal, spot
mopping in office areas, trash removal in office areas and
spot cleaning in office areas. All three claims were
affected by the finding that the cleaning ordered by the
Government on the contract was relatively poor. For
example, the classroom and office building represented in
the contract did not receive any dusting at all. This low
level of service caused many of the tenants to complain
about the janitorial services. The level of cleaning was
not generally sufficient to give the buildings an overall
clean appearance (SOW) . It was determined that the QAEs and
the contracting officer were expecting the entire floor to
appear clean when only a portion of the floor was
contractually reguired to be mopped (QAE Process) . The
trash removal and spot cleaning were not adeguately defined
within the task and freguency charts (PRS) . [Ref . 15]
3 . ASBCA No. 28966
This dispute with Kee Service Company arises under a
fixed-price reguirements contract to provide mess attendant
services. The Government made deductions because of
allegedly unsatisfactory services, all of which had been
evaluated by sampling methods. The official who prepared
the Performance Reguirements Summary (PRS) had no time to
make an analytical judgement concerning the contract values
percentages assigned to particular reguired services in the
performance reguirements summary chart. The values were
based on a "prototype" used by the Air Force and had no
correlation to the present contract. It was also found that
the QAEs had been enforcing and deducting for entire major
tasks when only a sub task or portion of the total task
failed to meet the standards (QAE Process) . [Ref . 16]
4. ASBCA No. 24802
This case involved Lewis Management and Service
Company appealing the contracting officer's final decision
terminating the contract for default. The evidence in the
record suggests that the appellant had bid its contract on
the basis that it would be able to hire experienced or
seasoned janitorial personnel at minimum wage. Because the
appellant figured its bid on the basis of paying too low a
wage rate it was obvious that they wanted to be awarded the
contract, even at a loss. The company deliberately bid
using the minimum wage as specified for personnel to meet
competition (Contractor). [Ref. 17]
5. ASBCA No. 22816
The case involves an appeal from Southeastern
Services, Incorporated of a contracting officer's final
decision which denied, in part, both appellant's settlement
claim for associated costs with the termination for
convenience and an eguitable adjustment for additional costs
attributed to Government directed changes in the performance
required under the contract. The performance of the
contract was unsatisfactory for the following reasons:
feeding times were not being met, food preparation was so
poor as to be unpalatable and sanitary requirements were
completely unsatisfactory. All three reasons were
attributed to the appellant's failure to have a sufficient
work force (Contractor) . [Ref . 18]
6. ASBCA No. 28829
This case involves a food service contract where
Leals Food Service, Inc., alleged that the Government
wrongfully deducted funds from the contract. This contract
was a Small Business Administration (SBA) section 8(a) set
aside. The contracting officer initially discovered that
the inspection and deduction system was not instituted as
planned after the one month phase-in period. It appears
that as a result of the mistake the QAEs instituted
inspection procedures that did not conform to the contract
specifications. As a result deductions were improper (QAE
Process) . [Ref. 19]
7. ASBCA No. 24398
This case involves Lewis Management and Service
Company with an appeal for an equitable adjustment as a
result of the Government's imposition of alleged extra food
preparation requirements and excessive Government
inspections. This contract was a Small Business
Administration (SBA) section 8(a) set aside. It was
determined that the QAEs had been helping instruct
contractor personnel when asked although realizing that this
task should be left to contractor's supervisors. The board
also determined that the frequency of disputed preparation
activities was indeterminate. There was no evidence as to
the general time frame when additional personnel were hired
or extra hours were worked. Additionally, no attempt was
made to link extra staffing or additional hours worked with
food preparation. The case is particularly interesting in
that the contractor was successful with an identical
contract for the same branch of Armed Service in a different
part of the state. Throughout the case, numerous references
to poor contractor supervision/leadership appear. It is
this researcher's opinion that the QAEs realized this and
were trying to assist in delivering quality service to the
supported personnel vice performing inspection tasks
incorrectly (QAE Process) . [Ref . 20]
8. Audit 5076510
The objective of this audit was to evaluate the
effectiveness of the quality assurance evaluation program
for base-level service contracts. Specifically, the Air
Force evaluated the adequacy of the quality assurance
inspection coverage, quality assurance program reviews made
by functional area chiefs and contract administrators, and
quality assurance measurement techniques. The audit was
performed at 14 locations where 24 typical service contracts
were being utilized. This judgmental sample was drawn from
approximately 380 base-level service contracts and
represents a cross section of base-level services procured
and administered under current Air Force Regulations. For
2 of the 24 service contracts reviewed, required QAE
surveillance inspections were not performed satisfactorily
or not performed at all. The Air Force also found that:
(1) QAE inspection results were not always documented or
properly reported, and (2) QAE performance was not being
sufficiently monitored by the functional area chiefs or base
contracting offices. Further, QAEs were not using random
sampling techniques properly, and sampling plans were not an
effective means for determining the acceptability of service
contractor performance (QAE Process) . [Ref . 21]
9. SO 78-450
The purpose of this audit was to determine whether
the Commercial and Industrial-Type Function (CITF) Program
was effectively implemented. The most common CITF at Army
installations, and the one most frequently performed by
contractors, was custodial services. Due to the extensive
experience of the Army installations in contracting this
service, the custodial contracts were reviewed to evaluate
the adequacy of the specifications. The evaluation stated
that the specifications were vague and did not adequately
describe the service to be provided. As a result, price
schedules, which show the amount the contractor will be paid
for the services, were not adequately structured. The vague
specifications precluded effective administration of
contracts. A monitor was appointed for each building
serviced by a contractor at eight of the ten installations.
The monitors were responsible for inspecting the work
performed by the contractors and determining whether the
work conformed to contract specifications. These monitors
received no training in contract administration. Since the
contract specifications were vague, unsatisfactory work
could not be objectively classified. This resulted in each
building monitor applying his own subjective standards to
the inspection process (SOW and QAE Process). [Ref. 22]
10. HO 87-804
The purpose of this audit was to examine food
service contracting issues relating to the bid process. It
was determined that the work specifications were not clear
and the solicitation had to be amended significantly, which
created a confusing solicitation package and delayed the bid
opening for nine months (SOW) . Vague work specifications
give bidders an opportunity to increase their chances of
being low bidder by under-bidding. Bidders anticipate that
contract costs will increase after award when vague
specifications are classified and contract modifications are
negotiated. (This is known as buying in.) [Ref. 23]
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Local Government Service Contractor
The purpose of this interview was to obtain
information from a local services contractor in regard to
which factor he felt most influenced service quality. The
largest contributing factor was the QAE/Inspection Process.
Specifically, the problems expressed were:
a. Fair application of quality inspection checklists.
b. QAEs spending a long period of time becoming familiar
with the contract and the specific language. The
implication here being that for as long as six months
there are no discrepancies and then everything was
incorrect.
c. Time allowed for reperformance—some QAE ' s ensure that
time is provided—others do not.
d. Imposition of standards that are different from the
SOW or PRS.
e. Personnel outside the contracting chain submitting
letters of commendation for personnel who are not
deserving.
12 . Fort Ord Contract Administration Personnel
The purpose of these interviews was to obtain
information from local contract administrators on factors
that influence service quality. There were two factors that
received equal emphasis and they were: (1) Contractor-
induced problems, and (2) the QAE/Inspection Process.
Specifically for the Contractor induced problems, the
following concerns were expressed:
a. The contractor is non-responsive to administrative
requirements
.
b. There appear to be labor violations as a result of
lack of attention to payroll accuracy.
c. There is a lack of interest in attending weekly
performance meetings.
d. Most contractors underbid personnel to obtain a
contract.
The QAE/Inspection Process problems were expressed as
follows:
a. There is conflict between military personnel and QAEs.
(A Commanding Officer forwards a letter of
commendation for services that are required as part of
the contract at the same time the QAE notes more
discrepancies.
)
b. QAEs fall under the purview and control of the
requesting agency while the Contracting Officer's
Technical Representatives fall under the contracting
section.
c. The number of contracts assigned to the QAE may be




The purpose of this interview was to obtain the
reasons his clients are usually successful at all disputes
processes. The reasons pointed to two factors, those being
the QAE/Inspection Process and the Contractor. He felt that
the contractors too often operated at a less than efficient
or adequate manpower level. Additionally, he felt that both
sides needed to communicate more clearly. This was
particularly true during inspections and more importantly at
performance review sessions. Also because QAEs seem to be
very transient and overworked, record-keeping can become a




A telephonic survey was conducted to determine the
amount of Government and service industry interaction. The
results indicated that none of the contractors contacted had
ever received a draft request for proposal or request for
information. The results and questions utilized are
contained in Appendix A.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. GENERAL
This chapter provides an analysis of the data presented
in Table 3.1 of Chapter III. This analysis will be
accomplished by summarizing the results as quantified under
the factors influencing service quality. Some assumptions
were necessary in order to analyze the data. These
assumptions are as follows:
1. The sample of data collected from each group is
representative of the population of that group.
2. The factors identified and utilized for Table 3.1 are
valid indicators.
The factors influencing service quality can be placed in
relative order of occurrence. The breakdown is as follows:





This factor represents a 47% rate of occurrence—almost
two times more prevalent than the next highest indicator.
This high percentage of occurrence can be attributed to the
following factors:
1. QAE inspection results are not always documented or
properly reported.
2. QAE performance is not being monitored properly.
3. QAEs were not using random sampling technigues
properly.
4. QAEs receive little or no training in contract
administration.
5. QAEs apply their own subjective standards to the
inspection process.
6. There are insufficient numbers of QAEs, causing
designated QAEs to be assigned a workload incapable of
being completed in reguired time frames.
All five of the methods used by the Navy to evaluate the
contractor's performance (as discussed in Chapter II) rely
on QAE inspections of service output to monitor contract
performance. To be effective, QAE inspections must be
accomplished in a timely manner, measure compliance with
performance standards, be accomplished in sufficient
guantity to satisfy the reguirements of random or planned
sampling as well as 100% inspections and be adeguately
documented to support both acceptable and unacceptable
performance. The Performance Reguirements Summary may
increase problems when a unigue checklist is used for each
reguired service. Accordingly, the number of reguired
checklists depends on the number of different contractor-
provided services. Accomplishing the reguired number of
inspections on time becomes more difficult as the QAEs
workload increases. As a direct result of this pyramid
effect the QAEs do not accomplish the reguired number of
inspections so they falsify inspection results by reporting
satisfactory service when inspections are not accomplished.
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Additionally they do not report substandard work or
deficiencies because the paperwork to document the
deficiencies is too hard to accomplish in the time frames
now available. This discrepancy as identified in Air Force
Audit 5076510 is directly related to the number of services
contracts in existence. As the number of service contracts
has increased—almost two-fold— it is logical to assume that
documentation problems have also grown.
The monitoring of QAE performance varies with the
different branches of the Armed Forces. In the Army, the
QAE generally is from the requesting activity or Directorate
of Logistics. This assignment policy generates conflict of
interest problems by the QAE attempting to serve both his
parent organization and the contract organization. This
conflict is further exacerbated by providing no established
system for analysis of QAE performance
—
primarily, who
provides it and how? In the Air Force, functional area
chiefs are required to review QAE job performance at least
semiannually to verify compliance with the contract
surveillance plan. In the Navy, QAEs can be part of the
contract administration section or be appointed by the
command to perform monitoring type functions. The clear
lack of standardization coupled with increasing manpower
constraints will continue to cause problems in contract
administration, individual performance evaluations and
personnel management.
The random sampling method of surveillance of services
rendered by the contractors has been in existence since the
late 1970 's. Prior to that time the method for inspecting
service contractors either covered 100% or judgmentally
selected sample of services provided. In theory, random
sampling is an important tool as it allows the QAE to make a
determination as to the quality of the entire service output
by statistically projecting the results of the random
sample. Additionally, random sampling provides the
Government an accepted methodology to reduce contractor
payments when sample results indicate unsatisfactory
contract performance. In order to achieve statistically
valid projections, statistical procedures as specified by
individual Armed Services regulations must be adhered to in
determining correct lot and sample sizes, selecting random
occurrences and in properly applying acceptance and
rejection numbers. The improper application of these
procedures negates the statistical validity of the random
sampling and consequently, inspection results can not be
accurately projected to the population and deductions are
improperly made.
An increasing number of QAEs are required as the number
of services contracts increase. The requirement for QAEs is
exceeding the contract administration section's ability to
properly train personnel in the facets of their jobs. This
fact coupled with the fact that some QAEs lack the clear
definition of chain of command are causing new problems for
the contract administrator.
One of the biggest problems caused by the lack of
training is the application of subjective standards.
Because the inspector does not understand how to read a
contract or apply statistical procedures he utilizes his own
definitions which may or may not be correct. This trend is
growing in the area of disputes litigation.
Because of resource constraints and the rapid growth of
service contracts, experienced QAE personnel are being
tasked with additional inspection responsibilities.
Throughout the research this researcher was amazed at the
volume of work required of the QAEs. The administrative
portion of their job, such as scheduling and routine
correspondence, often amount to several in boxes of work to
be processed. This administrative backlog can cause
problems for deductions when the reports are not timely. In
one case the reports reached the contract administrator 92
days after the fact.
C . CONTRACTOR
Failures of the contractor represented a 26% rate of
occurrence. This researcher believes if the number of
services contracts continues to rise, this will occur with
much greater frequency. The reason for a relatively high




1. The contractor has a lack of capable supervisors.
2. The contractor has ineffective quality control
measures.
3. The contractor fails to have a sufficient work force
as a direct result of paying too low a wage rate.
In order to
>
be competitive many contractors underbid in
the area of personnel or do not anticipate the problem of
hiring experienced personnel at prevailing wage rates
determined by the Secretary of Labor (Davis-Bacon Act,
Service Contract Act of 1965) . The personnel problem grows
exponentially and causes additional work for both the
contract administration personnel and inspection personnel.
The additional work stems from violations of the Contract
Work Hours Safety Act. The Act requires that no laborer
shall be required or permitted to work more than 40 hours in
any workweek unless paid for all additional hours at not
less than one and one half times the basic rate of pay.
QAEs have become increasingly involved as a receipt of a
complaint alleging violation or employee interviews
constitute valid compliance checks. The QAEs are becoming
more involved as the contractor's work force sees the QAE as
a direct representative who can help them. Until emphasis
is shifted from awarding to the lowest bidder this problem
will continue to grow.
D. STATEMENT OF WORK
The SOW factor represented a 16% rate of occurrence.
Even though this factor was rated third in a field of four
40
it is realized that all other factors are highly dependent
on this factor. The performance of the contractor and the
Government quality inspection method are direct functions of
the statement of work. The reason that the quality
inspection method is dependent on the SOW is due to the
rationale that contractor performance can only be measured
through specific requirements. This researcher chose to
evaluate this factor in terms of the definition of the
contract functions and the use of vague or ambiguous
specifications. The main cause of these problems stems from
the use and tailoring of generic statements of work and an
implied mentality that the field contracting office should
submit the SOW up the chain of command for revisions and
approval. The poorly defined functions and vague
specifications lead directly to increased costs in contract
price and administration. Contractors buy in at a low level
knowing that vague specifications will be clarified and
contract modifications will be negotiated. For example, the
Naval Audit Service reported in 1984 that in nine of 11
contract functions it reviewed, projected savings were not
realized due to higher than estimated contract administra-
tion costs and modifications increasing the scope of work.
Similarly, a 1983 Army Audit Agency report stated that the
average contract administration costs for 12 contracts it
reviewed were more than double the estimates used for the
cost study. [Ref. 24 :p. 4] Additionally the reliance on
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generic SOW's tend to lead to contradictions in definitions.
An example of this is spot cleaning. The Government
typically underdefines it in such a manner that the cleaning
results in criticism from the customers to such a degree
that drastic action is required to rectify the situation.
Special cleanups become the norm and the contract has to be
changed. Industry defines the initial cleaning as MINIMAL
CLEANING. What the Government often wants is defined (in
industry terms) as ADEQUATE CLEANING. This type of cleaning
typically represents a standard of cleaning that will
provide neither compliments or serious criticisms. The
extreme case would be ordering MINIMAL CLEANING when
PRESTIGE CLEANING is desired. This level means that a
cleaning complaint would be a rarity. These definitions
would have to be spelled out in the definitions section of
the SOW; but, would be more easily understood by a
contractor. [Ref. 25]
E. PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY
The performance requirements summary factor represented
an 11% rate of occurrence. The performance requirements
summary is designed to set objective standards for
determining whether service was satisfactory and to define
and measure the cost of each service to be performed. The
summary is intended to alleviate the expense and
administrative burden of the typical 100% inspection
methodology and place the performance and quality assurance
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burden directly on the contractor by applying sampling
techniques. These techniques identify representative
defects in the performance of services and permit
projecting the number of defects in the sample over a larger
lot for the purposes of justifying deductions. The problem
lies in the fact that the Government does not define to the
extent necessary those tasks to be evaluated by sampling and
then break the sampling tasks into reasonable levels. This
researcher reviewed two cases where the required services
were assigned a total value of over 100 percent of the
contract price. In both cases, the necessary modifications
were made; however, no deductions were allowed for
substandard performance prior to the completion of the
modifications. Additionally, it appears that the expert
advising the drafter of the SOW and PRS does not make an
analytical judgment concerning the contract value
percentages. Contract value percentages are used to arrive
at an amount of a deduction to be made when there is
unsatisfactory performance. They also often tend to be
contradictory to the language of the contract. The PRS and
the percentages place the emphasis of the work effort on
areas that are different from the SOW where the most
important functions are defined. For example, in a food
services contract food preparation may be the most important
of the factors to be evaluated by sampling while sweeping is
the least important. To assign a contract deduction value
of 0.1% to food preparation and a contract deduction value
of 10% to sweeping is contrary to the logic of importance
previously stated.
F . SUMMARY
Today, both the Government and contractors are facing
growing competitive and regulatory pressures to deliver
higher quality services. In an attempt to comply with these
pressures more emphasis has been placed on the inspection
process and subsequently on the contract administration
sections as they are tasked to develop and apply efficient
procedures for quality assurance. This researcher fully
anticipated finding that the SOW would be the largest
contributing factor influencing service quality. It is
directly related as the SOW forms the basis for the quality
assurance plan. The research emphasized that even the well-
written SOW's were not useful if the QAE did not understand
them or could not apply them. This researcher believes that
the reasons that caused the QAE/Inspection Process to be the
leading indicator were as follows:
1. Current manning levels in either the contracting
offices or unit level are understaffed in such a
fashion as to prevent efficient contract monitoring.
As a result the QAEs become mired in the
administration process and do not perform required
on-site inspections.
2. The present quality assurance measures are
inadequate or incorrect as there appears to be no
incentive to improve.
The personnel assigned as inspectors are not
properly trained in contract administration or
surveillance techniques and procedures.
Contractors rely on the inspectors to provide the
impetus or core for their quality assurance program.
V. SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The primary purpose of this thesis was to investigate
ways to draft and administer service contracts in a manner
that would improve contractor performance. This was
accomplished through extensive literature research and
interviews with Government and commercial services
personnel. Based upon this research, the researcher
concludes:
1. The use and tailoring of generic statements of work
often result in poorly defined functions and vague
specifications that lead to increased costs.
2. The performance reguirements summary often conflicts
with the statement of work resulting in errors that




The selection of a services contractor is based on the
lowest bid or price.
4 The use of a firm fixed price contract does not
provide the flexibility or the necessary profit margin
for all services contracts.
5. The selection, training and supervision of QAE
personnel has caused significant problems in contract
surveillance and administration.
6. The present method of assuring guality by random
sampling and detailed checklists is not providing the
desired level of service guality. As a result the
Government is unable to inspect and document all the
reguired services.
7. There is a pool of contractors that are not being
solicited for proposals because of a lack of
communication with the service industry.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based upon this research and conclusions, this
researcher suggests the following recommendations.
1 . Recommendation 1--The Drafting of Services Contracts
Could be Improved by Involving Industry in the
Development of Standards and the Statement of Work
(SOW)
In performing the research, this researcher was able
to obtain a list of services contractors in the Northern
California area. The list provided 154 names that included
a wide cross-section of contractors from small, closely-held
family firms to large corporations with numerous branches.
An informal telephone poll of 80 contractors (52%) confirms
the need to work with the service industry in that not one
contractor had ever received a draft Request for Proposal
(RFP) or Request for Information (RFI) . The survey also
indicated that contractors who have performed Government
work (60%) would be willing to respond to a draft RFP/RFI
(98%) . Additionally, professional trade associations such
as the Building Service Contractor's Association,
International (BSCAI) could be involved in the interchange
of information, streamlining of the specifications, and
updating of standards. For example, the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command Janitorial Handbook was published in
1975 and is in need of update to be a valid reference
document. The BSCAI can provide the latest methods and new
techniques developed for the industry as well as maintaining
a problem solving information network.
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With the growth in the contracted services expanding
rapidly and contractors continuing to increase their share
of the available market, DOD and the service industry must
establish clear policies and procedures well-adapted to
business objectives and to specific tasks and functions.
This active involvement between the Government and industry
would serve to meet goals established during the Packard
Commission for improvement in the acquisition process.
2 . Recommendation 2—Utilize Source Selection Proce-
dures That Will Provide the Most Qualified
Contractor
The selection of a good contractor is extremely
important to the success of the contracting effort, and yet
contracting procedures often leave this selection to chance,
basing the selection solely on the lowest bid. The emphasis
should be removed from cost and placed on management. In
the past, the requirements to use formal advertising
(Invitation for Bids [IFBs]) made source selection on any
basis other than lowest price almost impossible. However,
the Competition in Contracting Act allows the use of
competitive proposals (Request for Proposals [RFPs]) and
this new freedom permits evaluation and award to contractors
on the basis of their technical and managerial abilities.
Because service contracting is dependent on a steady work
force, management plays a decisive role in attaining quality
results. Some areas of management to be evaluated could be:
a. Personnel turnover—If it is high, what is causing
b. Management depth—Is the contractor's organization
dependent upon one person?
c. Supervisory organization—A review of the contractor's
organization should be made to determine the number of
workers he has per non-working supervisor, the control
over the supervisors, and if possible, the caliber of
supervision.
d. Is the contractor a member of a professional organiza-
tion that offers certification for key personnel,
training seminars and assistance if required. These
are not in themselves guarantees of quality any more
than a degree in medicine guarantees a good doctor;
however, they increase the probability of good
performance.
The use of RFPs for services contracts provides an
opportunity to ensure that a contractor can perform the work
before an award is made. Every service contract has
technical aspects that should be evaluated. This is
advantageous to the Government because the RFP reveals
potential performance problems. It is also advantageous to
the contractor as he has an opportunity to clarify
ambiguities and to correct or adjust their bids. The extra
time for . the evaluation will be saved later in the contract
not to mention the time saved if problems result in a
termination. Thus the use of an RFP source selection
procedure can ensure better service by allowing both
evaluation of cost and technical ability to perform.
3 . Recommendation 3—Utilize Cost Plus or Hybrid
Contracts Instead of Firm Fixed Price
The cost plus arrangement provides the flexibility
that is often needed when requirements are difficult to
quantify. The work statement will be less restrictive and
can be more performance oriented. To use a cost plus award
fee contract, cost control must be included as one of the
evaluation criteria within the award fee structure.
Additionally, the use of hybrid contracts could be useful in
situations in which a straight fixed price is not practical.
A hybrid contract is a contract that combines elements of
two (or more) different contract types. A variation of this
would be to utilize a contract with a hybrid fee structure.
In such a contract, award and incentive fees are combined,
with the award fee being subjective and based on quality of
service and the incentive fee being structured and based on
quality of service and the incentive fee being structured
and based on cost control.
4 . Recommendation 4—Improve the Methods for Selection,
Training, and Supervision of QAE Personnel
In the area of qualifications, the Government must
assure that the inspectors and QAEs collectively possess
professional proficiency to conduct a quality assurance
program. A step required prior to this is for the services
to place the QAEs under the contracting officer. This
placement would establish total accountability in the
contracting area and ensure training in both inspection
processes and contract administration was obtained.
Additionally, this placement would allow the contracting
office to institute proper staff qualifications and provide
a source of feedback for performance while ensuring
contractor compliance. By placing the QAEs under the
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contracting officer better use of all contracting personnel
could be accomplished. One broad approach toward solving
some of the personnel problems might be to divide job
responsibilities into a number of relatively unskilled and
skilled categories. This subdivision of work would permit a
smaller staff of QAEs to transfer statistical quality
assurance inspection requirements to a less trained
inspection staff— less trained in the area of statistical
quality assurance; however, well versed in functional
procedures such as food service or building maintenance.
This division of labor would be a cost effective method of
inspection/compliance. In turn the functional inspection
level employees would report their findings to the QAE
staff. The QAEs would then interpret the contractors'
performance and prepare reports to the contracting officer.
The direct flow, up and down the chain, with accountability
of functions well defined, would permit the Government to
accomplish the goals of contractor compliance.
5 . Recommendation 5—Introduce the Use of Flow Diagrams
and Process Charts to Involve the Contractor in
Quality and Surveillance Techniques
In OFPP Pamphlet 4, a standardized method is
provided for quality assurance on service contracts. During
the research, this researcher found that contract
administrators have found the suggested methods difficult to
use and extremely labor intensive. Deductions for poor
performance are often difficult to quantify and are even
harder to substantiate if a grievance is filed by the
contractor. It is the result of this methodology and
perceived regulation interpretation that the only way to
increase quality was to add inspectors and vigorously screen
out rejects and defects. The results were higher costs and
only minimal improvements in quality. Prevention is a far
more effective means for improving quality. If contractors
can prevent errors, thereby reducing the time and effort
devoted to fixing them, they can cut costs and improve
quality.
Flow diagrams and process charts can provide a
versatile technique for analyzing work methods. The overall
purpose of the flow diagram is to understand the process.
More specifically, the purpose is to get collective
agreement on what the process looks like, where problems
exist and what improvements can be made. When used
together, these two tools would allow both the Government
and the contractor to investigate a variety of situations
such as several operations being performed in sequence, flow
of work, and workers moving from place to place while doing
work. The process chart can be easily used by the worker as
a task checklist as well as the basis for instituting
statistical process control and inspection procedures. The
provisions of award fee contracts can give it added emphasis
by making it one of the evaluation criteria for the award
fee. Similarly, the contractor quality control plan and
organization could be evaluated during technical review of




The Government and contractors face the same challenges
and must work together to develop a coherent philosophy on
quality, grounded in a common language, common management
principles, common standards, and common goals.
D. RECOMMENDED AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Use of hybrid contracts and hybrid award fees for
services contracts.
2. Investigate the results of the Council of Defense and
Space Industry Association Task Force for the
feasibility of developing a syllabus on quality for
employees in both DOD and industry.
3. Determine if there are any service contractors within
the Department of the Navy that utilize the concept of
total quality management— if so, evaluate the
progress.
4. Evaluate the possibility of using methods analysis to
improve service contract output.
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APPENDIX A
REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL/REQUEST FOR INFORMATION SURVEY
A list of services contractors was provided to this
researcher by the Building Service Contractor's Association,
International. The list provided 154 contractors in
California that included a wide cross-section of contractors
from small, closely-held family firms to large corporations.
A number (80 of 154) of the contractors were asked the
following questions in a telephone survey:
1. Have you performed or are you performing a service
contract for the Government?
2
.
Have you ever received a draft request for proposal or
request for information from the Government?
3. Would you submit a response to the above request if
received?
The results are portrayed on the following pages in the
format of: Name of Contractor, Question 1, Question 2, and
Question 3. The questions utilized a yes or no answer.








































Jan Co No No No
Merchants Building
Maintenance No No Yes
Paradise Building Service No No No
Januz International, LTD. No No Yes
American Maintenance
Management Yes No Yes
Professional Maintenance
System Yes No Yes
Star Building Maintenance Yes No Yes
Daarco Building
Maintenance No No Yes
D'zine Services No No No
Qualitech Services Yes No Yes
Fletcher Certified
Services Yes No Yes
Cap-Tec Corporation No No Yes
Murphy Janitorial, Inc. Yes No Yes
Gibson Brothers Service Yes No Yes
Dial One Maintenance
Service No No Yes
DLB Maintenance Yes No Yes
Robert's Carpet Service Yes No No
Clean Masters Yes No Yes
C&P Building Maintenance Yes No Yes
Northern Building
Maintenance Yes No Yes
Myers Building Service Yes No Yes
Promaid Inc. No No Yes
The Cleaning Crew Yes No Yes
Night Owl Janitorial
Service No No Yes
Management Technical
Service Yes No Yes
Executive Cleaning
Specialists Yes No Yes
Omni Universal Services Yes No Yes
Pacific Building
Maintenance Yes No Yes
Kern Commercial Cleaning No No Yes
Expert Cleaning Service Yes No Yes
Clean-Tech Yes No Yes
Starlight Building
Maintenance Yes No Yes
Britannia Inc. No No Yes
Polaris Building
Management Yes No Yes
L&E Service Company Yes No Yes
Reliable Service Yes No Yes
Expert Building Service Yes No Yes








G or Z's Janitorial
Service






































































Number of Contractors Provided: 154
Number of Contractors Contacted: 80
Number Performing Government Work: 4 8
Number Receiving Draft RFP or RFI
:
Number that would respond to RFP/RFI
:
67
Number of contractors that have performed




1. Pope, William, Owner, L & E Service Company, Inc.,
Seaside, CA. 24 August 1989 (Personal)
.
2. Moranda, Toni-Marie, Contract Administrator, Fort Ord
Army Base, CA, 25 August 1989 (Personal)
.
3. Gerstl, Hugo, Attorney at Law, Gerstl & Gorman, Inc.,
Monterey, CA, 25 August 1989 (Personal)
.
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